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This paper documents a stylized fact: the Third World has been undergoing an 
emigration life cycle since the 1960s, and, except for Africa, emigration rates have 
been level or even declining since a peak in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. The 
current economic crisis will serve only to accelerate those trends. The paper estimates 
the economic and demographic fundamentals driving these emigration life cycles to 
the United States since 1970 – income and education gaps between the US and the 
sending country, poverty traps and the size of the cohort at risk in the sending country, 
and the migrant stock in the US. It then projects the life cycle up to 2024. The 
projections imply that pressure on Third World emigration over the next two decades 
will not increase, after which it will decline. It also suggests that future US 
immigrants will be more African and less Hispanic than in the past. 
 
 
JEL Codes:  F22, J1, O15 
 






 Country-Specific Emigration Life-Cycles 
 
  The academic literature and media reporting is written as if the rate of Third 
World mass migration will increase indefinitely, at least after the current recession. It is 
also written from the perspective of the host country demand side, ignoring the sending 
country supply side, as if that supply is perfectly elastic and will remain so indefinitely. 
Thus, Lant Pritchett tells us that “there are five irresistible forces in the global economy 
creating growing pressures for greater movement of labor … from poorer to richer 
countries” (2006: 138).  Such statements like Pritchett’s imply that immigration rates into 
high-wage host countries – unless checked by tougher immigration policy or by another 
great depression – will rise to ever-increasing heights as the economic gap between them 
and the sending countries remains large, as the industrialized world ages, as its share of 
working native-born adults shrinks, and as the demand for additional foreign-born young 
adults soars to fill the gap. History strongly suggests the contrary, and it also suggests 
that analysts should pay much more attention to the supply side. 
 
Immigration vs Emigration: Denominators Matter 
  To begin with, we need to shed our conventional Euro-centric and American-
centric instincts and look at the problem from the point view of the Third World. That is, 
in calculating migration rates let us begin by replacing the receiving country population 
or labor force in the denominator with the sending country population or labor force. 
After all, the growth rate of the former has been slowing down since the post-war baby 
boom, and in some countries, like Italy and Japan, native-born population growth is fast 
approaching zero or even negative rates. Under these demographic conditions, even   2
constant emigration rates would yield rising immigration rates. In the denominator, when 
host country populations – growing so slow at the end of their demographic transition – 
are replaced by sending country populations – growing so fast in the middle of their 
demographic transition, Third World emigration rates are capable of tracing out quite 
different patterns than those of high-wage host country immigration rates. Indeed, as we 
shall see below, they trace out what we have called elsewhere country-specific 
emigration life cycles (1998: Chp. 3; 2005: Chps. 1 and 4), and they often offer leading 
indicators for what to expect regarding immigration rates.  
 
European Pre-1914 Emigration Life Cycles  
  Country-specific emigration life cycles across the long 19
th century make it clear 
that real wage or income per capita gaps will not by themselves explain emigration: 
during the course of modern economic growth in Europe, country emigration rates rose 
steeply at first from very low levels, after which the rise began to slow down as the 
emigration rates climbed to a peak, and subsequently they fell. This life cycle stylized 
fact has emerged from study after study, both for aggregate time series of country 
emigration rates and for regional emigration rates within countries (Gould 1979; Hatton 
and Williamson 2005: Chp. 4).  
Several explanations have been offered for this pre-1914 stylized fact, but we 
have previously found Figure 1 a useful way to think about it. Here, movements along 
some downward-sloping home country emigration function (EM) are isolated from shifts 
in that function (Hatton and Williamson 1994; 1998: Chapter 2; 2005: Chp. 4). In poor, 
pre-industrial, agrarian economies, we observe low emigration rates (e0) and low real   3
wages or living standards (w0).
1 Industrialization, accumulation, and productivity 
advance then serve to shift the emigration function outward to EM' and to raise real 
wages to w1. The impact of economic growth on the home wage may be obvious, but the 
outward shift in the EM function may not. Indeed, the outward shift in EM dominates in 
this example since emigration rates have risen to e1; in the absence of the shift in EM, 
emigration rates would have fallen to e1'. In later stages of development, EM is taken to 
be stable so that further improvements in real wages at home, to w2, cut back emigration 
rates to e2. Should EM shift backwards, the downside of the emigration life cycle will be 
even steeper. Thus, Figure 1 can easily reproduce the emigration life-cycle.  
  But what might account for the rightward shift in EM during the start of modern 
economic growth and its stability, or even backward shift, thereafter? The first 
explanation appeals to the costs of migration. Although there is certainly a strong 
incentive to flee pre-industrial poverty and rural subsistence, the costs are likely to be 
prohibitive for most poor laborers. After all, the potential migrant cannot get loans for the 
move (a classic case of capital market failure), and his current income is too close to 
subsistence to make it possible to accumulate the necessary savings to invest in some 
future, long distance move. Thus, enormous wage gaps between an industrial, resource-
rich, high-wage country and an agrarian, resource-poor, low-wage country can be quite 
consistent with low emigration rates. In short, poor agrarian countries are locked in a 
poverty trap so that those who have the most to gain from the move are least able to 
exploit the opportunity. But as modern development takes hold in the home country, real 
wages rise and the supply constraint on emigration is gradually released: more and more 
                                                 
1 Ceteris paribus applies to Figure 1, so conditions abroad are taken as given, including real wages. Thus, 
any rise in the home wage in the figure implies some catching up with high wage immigration countries.   4
potential emigrants can now finance the move, and, in contrast with conventional theory, 
the home wage and emigration are positively correlated. The supply constraint is also 
released by greater remittances coming from an increasing stock of emigrants abroad. As 
industrialization at home continues, the backlog of potential migrants is slowly exhausted 
as more and more workers find it possible to finance the move. When the migration cost 
constraint is no longer binding, further increases in the real wage cause the emigration 
rate to decline from the peak, as conventional theory predicts.   
Thus, emigration histories should pass through two regimes, the first emigrant 
supply constrained, and the second emigrant demand constrained, as in Figure 2. The 
emigrant-supply-constrained regime is consistent with rising emigration and rising home 
wages, and it can also be made consistent with the downward-sloping EM function in 
Figure 1 by appealing to rightward shifts in that function induced by absolute wage 
increases (as opposed to relative wages and catching up).  At some point, home wages get 
high enough so that financial constraints are no longer binding: further increases in the 
home wage then reduce the emigration rate as the economy moves up and back along a 
more stable EM function, and emigration experience enters the demand-constrained 
regime. While this tale of regime switch certainly sounds plausible, we should remember 
that it takes no account of changing conditions in the receiving countries. If the 
emigration rate is ever to decline from its peak after the regime switch, the sending region 
has to begin catching up with the receiving region, as described in Figure 1. If it does not 
undergo catching up, the downside of the life cycle may never be reached. 
  Of course, there are more forces driving the emigration life cycle than simply 
costs of the move and wage catch up. Here are three. First, even after controlling for   5
poverty-induced cost constraints, illiteracy can be a barrier to emigration. Thus, as late 
19
th century eastern and southern European countries underwent a revolution in 
elementary schooling (Kirk 1946; Easterlin 1981; Williamson 2007), young adults were 
empowered to exit, an effect sufficiently strong that they were able to leap over the 
literacy requirement passed by the United States Congress in 1917 to keep them out 
(Hatton and Williamson 2005: Chps. 8 and 9; Williamson 2007). This schooling effect 
should shift the EM curve in Figure 1 outward until all potential migrants are literate,
2 
after which EM remains stable. Second, the number at risk will matter. When countries 
start modern development, they also start a demographic transition: child mortality rates 
fall, and about two decades later the young adult cohort swells. Thus, for the same costs 
and benefits to a move, more will do so as the share of the population mobile rises. This 
too will shift the EM curve in Figure 1 outward, but as the demographic transition 
continues, the young adult cohort share will eventually start to shrink, and the EM curve 
will shift back inwards to the left. Hence, the emigration life cycle is strengthened by the 
demographic transition. Third, a rising stock of previous emigrants living abroad 
generates the well-known friends and relatives affect: by helping finance the move and 
lowering the cost of job search, previous emigrants serve to augment the current flow of 
new emigrants. This effect is big at the start of the emigrant life cycle, as the emigrant 
stock abroad rises steeply from low levels. But as the rate of growth in the immigrant 
stock in the host country slows down, so too does the friends and relatives effect,
3 thus 
causing the EM curve to stabilize. In short, outward shifts in the EM curve – more young 
                                                 
2 Of course, what matters here is the schooling of the young prior to their reaching migration ages, not the 
schooling (or its absence) of the older adults they leave behind. 
3 Aging of the immigrant stock abroad may have the same effect as family and kin ties weaken with 
assimilation in the host country.   6
adults at risk, lower costs of the move, more resources to finance the move, and more 
literate potential movers – contribute to an emigration boom, while a cessation in these 
forces, and wage catching up, contribute to an emigration bust.  
 
The Third World Emigration Life Cycle since the 1960s 
 
  Pre-1914 mass migration without state intervention is one thing, but what about 
post-1970 mass migration under quotas and other restrictions?  Here we focus on 
migrants from the three major developing regions: Latin America, including the 
Caribbean; the Middle East, North Africa and Asia; and Sub-Saharan Africa. We exclude 
from consideration the countries of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as these 
are affected by the political regime change in the middle of the period.
4 Table 1 shows for 
the five-year periods between 1970-4 and 2000-4
5 the immigration rates to the US 
(migrants relative to US population) and emigration rates (migrants relative to source-
region population), with 1970-4 = 100. Three things stand out in the upper two panels. 
First, immigration rates increase much more steeply than do emigration rates. The surge 
of migrants looks a lot more modest when standardized by the more rapidly-growing 
source populations.
6 Second, emigration rates often tend to lead immigration rates: thus, 
Asian emigration rates peaked a decade before immigration rates. Third, Asian 
emigration rates reached a peak in the 1980-84 while Latin American emigration rates 
                                                 
4 We also exclude the poor counrties of Oceania where the numbers are miniscule.     
5 The migration rates are for fiscal years 1970/1-2004/5. 
6 It would look even more modest if the emigrants were included in the denominator, although the 
differences are slight.     7
reached a peak just a half decade later, in 1985-94. By contrast, the emigration rate from 
Sub-Saharan Africa continued to grow throughout the period.  
  The lower panel of Table 1 provides a more detailed breakdown for Latin 
America and Asia. It shows that the trend in Latin American emigration is not just due to 
Mexico (which accounted for about half of all US immigration from the Americas during 
the 1991-2000 decade, including Canada: Hatton and Williamson 2005: p. 208). Neither 
is it solely due to the legalization of undocumented migrants (principally from Mexico) 
that affected the figures in 1989-91. Emigration rates from the Caribbean, Central 
America and South America all have peak emigration rates in the decade 1985-94. The 
pattern for Asia is similar but a bit more mixed: North African and Middle Eastern 
(MENA) emigration rates underwent a pronounced decline after 1980-4; East Asian rates 
underwent a more modest decline after 1990-94; and the South Asian decline after 1990-
94 was actually reversed in 2000-04.  
  These trends raise four questions. First, are they driven by a few countries with 
very large immigrant numbers that dominate the regional totals? Or, is there a distinct life 
cycle pattern in the emigration rates even if we give equal weight to each country? We 
investigate this possibility by regressing the log of emigration rates (to allow for 
differences in scaling) on time and time squared for all the countries in each regional 
sample over the seven five-year periods 1970-4 to 2000-4, using country fixed effects. 
Table 2 shows that for the 26 countries of Latin America and the Caribbean there is a 
significant inverted U with a maximum in the early 1990s. A similar (significant) life 
cycle pattern is found for 35 countries in the North Africa, the Middle East and Asia; the 
squared term is negative and the peak occurs in the early 1990s. By contrast, only the   8
linear term is significant for Sub-Saharan Africa, the sending region containing the 
poorest countries. These results confirm a fall in emigration rates for two of the major 
sending regions, while the third has yet to reach its peak.  
  Second, is the fall in Third World emigration rates just for those going to the 
United States, or are the same effects observed for other immigrant host countries? Table 
3 shows immigration and emigration rates to Canada and Germany from the three 
sending regions.
7 The Latin American and Asian immigration rates for Canada have been 
falling since 1990-94, repeating the US pattern. This suggests that the slowdown and fall 
in immigration rates from the early 1990s is not just the result of US-specific policy 
changes. And, again repeating the US pattern, immigration rates from Africa and Asia 
rose much more steeply over the long term than did the emigration rates. Also, the 
emigration rates from Asia and Latin America into Canada have fallen more dramatically 
since 1990-94 than have immigration rates, as has been true of the US. Finally, the rise in 
the emigration rate to Canada from Africa, once again, was slower than for the 
immigration rate.  
  The lower panels of Table 3 document the immigration and emigration rates to 
Germany. These comparisons are complicated by German reunification in 1990 and the 
migration rates here are based on the combined population throughout. The German 
immigration rates display a strong upward trend to 1990-94, and a fall (or a pronounced 
slowdown in the rise) thereafter. Once again, emigration rates show a more pronounced 
life cycle than do immigration rates.
8  
                                                 
7 Other host countries do not offer the kind of evidence necessary for the empirical analysis which follows. 
8 Note that both the immigration and the emigration rates from Turkey fall steeply from the end of the 
guestworker era after 1974.   9
  Third, are the recent downward trends or pronounced slowdowns in emigration 
rates simply due to tougher immigration policies in host countries rather than to declining 
emigration pressure in source regions? Imagine for a moment that the immigration rate 
reflects only policy and that policy has been aimed at stabilizing immigration relative to 
the home population. This implies that emigration rates from regions with rapidly 
growing populations should fall. Under such conditions, policy gets tougher, and all the 
more so if there are pressures pushing up source country emigration rates.  
  Finally, if emigration policy got tougher over time, did emigration pressure from 
sending countries create those policies? That is, can immigration policies in host 
countries be viewed as an endogenous political response to rising emigration pressure 
abroad? Perhaps, but it does not appear to have been the case that immigrants from Latin 
America, Asia and Africa have crowded out potential immigrants from other regions, an 
effect that would have eased any political pressure for tougher immigration restrictions. 
That is, while emigration from eastern Europe, southern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union fell as a proportion of US immigration from the 1960s to the 1980s, that share 
stabilized between the 1980s and 1990s. In any case, the central point is this: when 
analyzing trends in migration from any source region, overall host country policy 
constraints must be taken in to account. The empirical work that follows does just that.  
 
 
Possible Causes of the Third World Emigration Life Cycle  
   10
Here we focus on emigration rates to the United States from Latin America, Asia 
and Africa. After all, the US is home to more than half of the stock of inter-continental 
immigrants from these regions. US immigration offers the best opportunity to evaluate 
the longer term trends since its immigrants come from a wider variety of countries over a 
longer period than is true for most other host countries. Thus, we can include more source 
countries in the empirical analysis without having to place too much weight on migration 
streams that are small and volatile.  
Our goal is to identify the source country economic and demographic 
fundamentals that drive emigration to the US. As in all migration models, the major 
determinant is income of the home country relative to US. However, the incentive to 
migrate does not depend just on income gaps, but also on the human capital of the 
potential migrant needed to exploit the gap. Therefore, we also include relative education, 
using average years of schooling in the home country relative to the US (Barro and Lee 
2001). The positive effect of home country education that is often found in migration 
equations reflects the fact that higher home education for a given income level implies a 
lower rate of return to education at home. Alternatively, schooling in the home country 
gives the potential emigrant the credentials to take advantage of the higher relative 
income in the host country.
9  
Two demographic fundamentals feature in most migration models. The first is the 
relative size of the migration intensive cohort, reflecting the fact that the net present value 
                                                 
9 In any case, the result should not necessarily be interpreted as suggesting that the more educated have 
higher mobility.  
 
   11
of a given income gap is higher for young adults. To measure this first demographic 
fundamental, we use the relative size of the cohort aged 0-14 fifteen years before the date 
of observation.
10 The second key demographic fundamental is the stock of immigrants 
from the source country resident in the US. This measures the friends and relatives effect 
that is thought to diminish the cost and uncertainty of migration. Most studies find this 
effect to be powerful. Perhaps even more to the point, the friends and relatives effect 
should be all the more powerful in the presence of immigration policies that favor family 
reunification, as they do in the US.
11 We measure the effect by dividing the US migrant 
stock from each source country by the source country population at the beginning of each 
five year period.   
It is widely recognized that poverty acts as a constraint on migration owing to 
capital market imperfections. This constraint is especially important for long-distance 
moves as it is hard to raise a loan for an investment in a move which takes the borrower 
out of the lender’s jurisdiction. Here we proxy the share of the population in poverty by a 
non-linear transformation of per capita income so that the poverty-reducing effects of an 
increase in income are more powerful at lower income levels.  While poverty implies 
lower mobility, the poverty constraint is likely to be loosened by having friends and 
relatives at the destination: hence, the larger the migrant stock in the host country, the 
less the poverty constraint facing potential emigrants.  
                                                 
10 The size of the 0-14 age group lagged fifteen years is used rather than the current size of the 15-29 age 
group since the latter is likely to be diminished by (the predicted) high exit rates. 
11 The friends and relatives effect should be much more powerful for the US where family reunification 
policy has always been more generous. Family reunification could also weaken the role of young adult 
cohort size in pushing emigrants out of sending countries. This prediction could be explored by a 
comparison of emigration rates to the US with that of other host countries, an issue not explored here or, as 
far as we know, elsewhere in the literature.   12
Finally, and as noted earlier, immigration policies must be considered in the 
analysis. If immigration policies have become tougher since the early 1990s, then this 
fact could account for the slow down or decline in emigration rates in recent years. One 
way of taking host country policy into account is to include period fixed effects which 
should capture any common trends in migration across different source countries, like 
host country policy. An alternative approach is to include a measure of the overall 
immigration quota in the analysis: here, policy ‘toughness’ is measured as the total US 
immigration quota relative to the population of all three sending regions (see Appendix). 
We much prefer the quota-based measure, but we will try both in the analysis.   
 
Explaining Third World Emigration to the United States 1970-2005 
 
Table 4 presents the results of regressions for emigration rates to the US from 62 
countries in Latin America, Asia and Africa (see Appendix). We use a balanced panel, 24 
of the countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, 25 in Asia, the Middle East and 
North Africa, and 13 in sub-Saharan Africa. The African sample is limited by the data 
both for migration and for the explanatory variables. The dependent variable is the log of 
five-year total emigration rates for fiscal years (e.g. 1970-4 includes the fiscal years 
1970/1 to 1974/5), while all explanatory variables are for the beginning of the five year 
period (e.g. 1970, 1975). Fixed country effects ensure that we focus on the trends over 
time, absorbing in the fixed effects variables such as distance between the source country 
and the US, whether the source country is English speaking, and cultural affinities 
between the two.    13
  The column (1) regression includes five-year period dummies which capture 
changing immigration policies and any other trends, such as falling migration costs and 
information diffusion that would be common to all source countries. The cohort effect is 
the right sign but not significant in this regression. However, the income ratio and the 
education ratio are strongly significant with the expected signs. Furthermore, the two 
estimated coefficients are of a similar magnitude, supporting the view that relative 
income and relative education should have equal and opposite effects. The log ratio of the 
emigrant stock to source country population is strongly positive, reflecting the power of 
the friends and relatives effect, enhanced by the immigration policy filter. While the 
effect of poverty is negative as predicted, it is attenuated by an increase in the emigrant 
stock, also as predicted.  
  The column (2) regression replaces the period dummies with our preferred 
immigration policy constraint variable. Controlling for the policy environment properly 
serves to increase the size and significance of the cohort size coefficient and to reduce the 
size of the still-significant relative income and relative education coefficients. The effect 
of a one percentage point increase in the size of the migration-sensitive cohort in the 
source country increases emigration to the US by about 2.4 percent. This effect is large—
at the sample averages it implies an increase in five-year emigration rates of about 3 per 
thousand of the source population between the early 1970s and the early 1990s. The 
effect of the migrant stock is also large: an increase of one percent in the US source 
country migrant stock increases the emigration rate by about 0.32 percent. At the sample 
means (including the interaction with poverty), this implies a chain migration effect 
where for every 1000 of the stock of previous migrants a further 90 would arrive in the   14
following five-year period, or 18 each year. That figure was much the same in the 19
th 
century (20 each year: Hatton and Williamson 2005, p. 65), and, as we shall see, this has 
important implications for the dynamics of migration since it means that migration 
streams persist long after the original shocks that created them.    
The effect of source country poverty is of special interest. Excluding the 
interaction with the migrant stock, a doubling in per capita income from US$1,000 to 
$2,000 (about equivalent to the East and Southeast Asian per capita income level in 1960 
and its growth rate between 1960 and 1985, 3.4 percent: Maddison 2008) increases the 
emigration rate by 12 percent. In contrast, an increase for today’s middle income country 
from $10,000 to $11,000 has a negligible effect on the emigration rate (0.03 percent). To 
see more clearly how the poverty-constraint-eradication effect contributes to the 
emigration life cycle, note that a 50 percent increase in per capita income at $1000 raises 
the emigration rate by 9 percent while the same percentage increase at $10,000 raises the 
emigration rate by just 0.1 percent. That is, the poverty effect is non-linear, powerful at 
low-income levels and weak at middle-income levels. Thus, the poverty effect by itself 
can produce the emigration life cycle.  
But there are two forces that tend to offset the poverty constraint. The first offset 
operates through the relative income gap. With no change income at the destination and 
no change in relative education, a 50 percent increase in per capita income from $1,000 
reduces emigration by 12 percent—exactly offsetting the poverty effect. However, if per 
capita income growth at home is positive but does not exceed that of the US, then 
emigration pressure rises. The second effect can occur through the interaction with the 
migrant stock. For example, when a country with a migrant stock abroad equivalent to 10   15
per thousand of the home population enjoys an increase in per capita income from $1000 
to $2000, the emigration rate increases by just 1.3 percent, as compared with a 12 percent 
increase for a country with zero migrant stock (i.e. no emigration history). Thus for poor 
countries, a large migrant stock in the host country can largely eliminate the poverty 
constraint, as it did for the Irish in the 19
th century.   
The regressions in columns (3) and (4) explore the result when the interaction 
between the poverty proxy and the migrant stock is omitted. It matters. In column (3), the 
poverty effect is now negligible, which highlights the importance of the friends and 
relatives effect in releasing the poverty constraint. Column (4) shows that in the absence 
of the migrant stock the effect of the coefficients on relative income and relative 
education increase dramatically. This is because the migrant stock reflects past 
immigration, which in turn depends on past gaps in relative income and relative 
education that persist to the present. In effect, without the migrant stock, economic 
fundamentals matter much more since migrants tend to be driven by job opportunities 
rather than family ties. 
 
Decomposing the Sources of Trends in Third World Emigration Rates 
 
This section explores emigration rate trends by source region to see how the 
fundamentals that determine emigration (Table 4) influenced long term trends. Table 5 
compares actual log emigration rates with predicted rates in our balanced panel for each 
of the seven five-year periods, both expressed as deviations from the overall 1970-2004 
mean for the source region. The patterns observed for these mean deviations do not   16
exactly replicate Tables 1 and 2 since they are estimated with a smaller sample of source 
countries. Nevertheless, the patterns are certainly consistent.  
The actual or observed mean deviation for Latin America and the Caribbean rises 
from 36 log points below the average in 1970-4 to 31 log points above the average in 
1985-9 before falling close to the mean in 2000-4. The predicted values rise from 44 log 
points below the average in 1970-4 to a plateau of 22 log points above the average from 
1985-9 onwards. For the Asia, Middle East and North Africa region, there is a steep 
increase in observed mean deviations from -39 log points in 1970-4 to a peak of 26 log 
points in 1990-4 followed by a decline to 16 log points in 2000-4. The predicted values 
yield a similar profile, although the predicted peak occurs in 1985-9 rather than 1990-4. 
As was found in Table 2, the trajectory for sub-Saharan Africa is a fairly linear upward 
trend. This is evident in both the actual and predicted series although it is stronger in the 
former.  
Two questions naturally follow. The first, which we pursue here, is this: How do 
the underlying explanatory variables account for these emigration trends in the source 
regions? We save the second for the next section: What happens to the Third World 
emigration rate when the explanatory variables are projected into the future? In order to 
examine the contributions of the different variables we multiply the change in the 
explanatory variable by its coefficient in column 2 of Table 4. Table 6 reports the 
decomposition for changes in the emigration rates in log points. For Latin America and 
the Caribbean and for Asia, the Middle East and North Africa we distinguish between the  
upswing from 1970-4 to 1990-4 and the subsequent decade whereas for sub-Saharan 
Africa we take the three decades as a whole.     17
In all three sending regions, the migrant stock effect made the most important 
contribution to the emigration rate boom, reflecting the importance of family 
reunification in US immigration policy. There is, however, another way of interpreting 
the migration stock effect: it has embedded in it the impact of all these fundamentals that, 
in the past, brought the primary mover to the United States. Thus, consider the share each 
fundamental contributed to the residual difference between the sum of all effects up to 
peak and that of the migrant stock (0.59-0.38 = 0.21 for Latin America, 0.55-0.36 = 0.19 
for Asia, and 1.04-0.65 = 0.39 for Africa). Using this accounting, here are the 
contributions of the key fundamentals in percent for the three regions up to their life 
cycle peaks: for Latin America, income gap 38, birth cohort 33, education gap 24, and 
poverty 5; for Africa, income gap 68, education gap 27, birth cohort 20, and poverty  
-15 (worsening poverty rates); and for Asia, income gap -11 (Asian miracle catch-up 
effects), education gap 63, birth cohort 32, and poverty 16. In short, everywhere in the 
Third World the emigration boom was driven by the schooling revolution (education 
catch up) and the demographic transition (fatter young adult cohorts) in sending 
countries, while in Latin America and Africa, it was also a rising income gap. Note also 
that the fall from the peak in Latin America and Asia (first versus second columns in 
Table 6) were driven entirely by declining birth cohort forces (smaller young adult 
cohorts as the demographic transition unfolded), declining education gap forces 
(schooling revolutions slowed down in sending regions), and declining migration stock 
forces.  
What Will Third World Emigration Rates Look Like in the Future? 
   18
What should we assume about host country policy when we project the future? 
Clearly immigration policy has important effects on the numbers who are able to 
emigrate to the United States. Recall that our measure of the overall immigration 
constraint is the total US quota divided by the total population of the three sending 
regions for each five year period. While the overall quota trended upward, so did the 
population of the three sending regions. As it turns out, there has been no change in the 
US policy constraint since 1970, at least as we have defined it.
12 Thus, the projections 
will assume that there will be neither tightening nor loosening in the immigration 
constraint in the near future.   
To examine the underlying trends in the explanatory variables by sending region, 
in our balanced panel they are regressed on a quadratic in time, with country fixed 
effects. We have observations for each of the explanatory variables on most of the 
countries back to 1960. The demographic projection (which involves a lagged variable) 
relies on the UN’s estimates up to 2020. The squared term is dropped where it is 
insignificant. The results are provided in Table 7.  
The size of the relevant birth cohort follows a strong quadratic inverse U shape 
trend for all three sending regions. The birth cohort variable trend peaks is in the late 
1980s for Latin America and Asia, while that for sub-Saharan reaches a peak around 
2000.  In contrast, the relative income and relative education trends are uniformly linear. 
Latin America exhibits some falling behind in income per capita relative to the US (the 
positive coefficient 0.0603 implying a rise in the income gap), but some catching up in 
                                                 
12 Our measure of policy exhibits an inverse U shaped trend that is almost entirely the result of the 
legalization program under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 that resulted in a large 
increase in recorded migration in 1989-91, most of which came from Mexico. If we exclude this 
component of the policy index then there is no evidence of a trend. When this modified version of log 
policy is regressed on a trend the coefficient is -0.011, with a ‘t’ value of 0.51.      19
relative education (the negative coefficient -0.048 implying a fall in the education gap) . 
Sub-Saharan Africa fell further behind in relative income even more than Latin America 
but exhibited even greater catching up in relative education. The trend in poverty has 
been clearly downwards in Latin America, and even more so in Asia, although in both 
cases it flattens out as would be expected given the functional form of the poverty 
variable. Sub-Saharan Africa’s poor economic performance is reflected by a linear 
upward trend.
13  
The projected emigration rates are derived using the quadratic or linear trend in 
the fundamentals as reported in Table 7. The trends in these variables will have a 
cumulative effect on emigration rates since they affect the host country migrant stock in 
successive periods, thus influencing future emigration rates. For each of the fundamentals 
in Table 7, we calculate the effect of the change on emigration rates in each period but we 
also take account of the effect on the migrant stock in subsequent periods. Thus, the 
simulation updates the migrant stock in each period and adds the indirect effects on 
emigration through the migrant stock (including its interaction with poverty) to the direct 
effect in the subsequent period. Table 8 reports the overall difference in log points 
between the simulated emigration rate in 2020-4 and in the base period 2000-4. These are 
averages for the individual countries in each regional group.  
For Latin America and Asia, demographic pressures are predicted to reduce 
emigration rates by 21-22 log points on average. These demographic forces will dominate 
trends in emigration rates in the future since no other fundamental will do anywhere near 
the work that this one will in these two regions. However, the combined effects of 
                                                 
13 Note, however, that the level of significance (t = 1.78) is lower for sub-Saharan Africa, reflecting the 
large variance in economic performance across the region.   20
relative income and relative education partially offset the effect of demographic trends: 
the two combined increase emigration rates by 12 log points in Latin America and 8 log 
points in Asia. Sub-Saharan Africa offers a sharp contrast: the demographic effects are 
negative but small, while the relative income and relative education effects are both 
positive, adding up to a powerful 30 log points. The effects of rising poverty (including 
the interaction with the migrant stock) are neutral for Latin America -- where the poverty 
constraint is less binding, and positive for Asia – where poverty more binding but is 
being quickly eroded. Poverty is projected to increase in sub-Saharan Africa and its 
impact tends to reduce emigration rates powerfully (larger than the birth cohort or income 
gap effect): the effects are negative as the direct effect of deepening poverty outweighs 
the interaction with the migrant stock.  
The penultimate row in Table 8 shows the independent effect of the migrant 
stock. This arises because migrant stocks are projected to increase even in the absence of 
any further ‘push’ from the other emigration fundamentals. The higher is current 
emigrant flow relative to the previous migration stock, the greater is the rate of increase 
of the stock, which in turn boosts emigration rates in the next period. These migrant stock 
dynamics produce effects that persist into the future at different rates for different source 
regions. For the Latin American countries, where the current migrant stock is relatively 
high relative to the flow, the stock dynamics have no effect (0 log points). For the Asia 
and MENA countries, where the current migrant stock is lower, dynamics increase the 
emigration rate by 8 log points between 2000-4 and 2020-4. The most striking result, 
however, is for sub-Saharan Africa, where the migrant stock is low relative to the current   21
flow: in this case, stock dynamics are projected to increase the emigration rate by an 
enormous 21 log points.    
Adding these effects together, the overall projection implies a decline in the 
emigration rate from Latin America and the Caribbean, and a stable emigration rate from 
Asia, the Middle East and North Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa, on the other hand, is 
projected to undergo a steep increase of 19 log points in its emigration rate, driven by 
rising income gaps, falling education gaps and migrant stock dynamics. When the three 
regions are weighted by shares in total US immigration, the projected result is a modest 
fall of 1.8 log points in the overall emigration rate. Alternatively, when they are weighted 
by sending region populations, the result is a modest increase of 2.7 log points. When we 
look beyond 2024, the migrant stock dynamics weaken and the continued fall in the other 
fundamentals will almost certainly cause Third World emigration rates to fall.  
In contrast with media hysteria and academic assumption, these results strongly 
support the view that there will be no mounting emigration pressure from the Third 
World over the next two decades, and it is likely to fall thereafter. Of course, if Africa 
starts to register double digit GDP per capita growth rates, the fall in emigration rates 
may be postponed since unlocking the poverty trap would offset the effect of reduction in 
the income gap for some time. Furthermore, if sending countries resumed their schooling 
revolutions achieved during the 1950s and 1960s (say, growth rates 5 percent higher than 
the US), Third World emigration rates might increase rather than fall. 
  
   Why Did Third World Emigration Wait Until After the 1960s?  
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  Why didn’t the Third World post-war emigration boom start in the late 1940s, the 
1950s or the 1960s? After all, the income gap between industrial and Third World 
countries was huge. Why did the boom wait until the 1970s? Now that we have analyzed 
the Third World emigration life cycle over the half century 1970-2024, the answers 
should be clearer. Four fundamental forces emerged simultaneously, and all four 
underwent dramatic change between the 1950s and 1970s: 
Leveling the policy playing field: From the Emergency Quota Act of 1921 until the 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (which became effective in mid-1968), the US 
applied strict country of origin quotas that were related to the stock of foreign-born in the 
US population before the First World War. The 1965 Act replaced this regime with a 
non-discriminatory policy under which migrants from all countries could compete 
equally for immigration into the US,
14 first under separate quotas for the Eastern and 
Western Hemispheres and then under a combined worldwide quota after 1979.
15 The new 
policy regime also greatly favored immigrants arriving by family reunification, most of 
whom did not even fall under the quota.  
   The composition of US immigrants by source changed dramatically between the 
1950s and the 1970s. The European, Canadian and Oceanic share fell by about 45 
percentage points, and the Third World share rose by 55 percentage points, the rise for 
Asia by itself 29 percentage points (Hatton and Williamson 2005: Table 10.2). Policy 
reform certainly opened up opportunities for migrants from poor countries, but dramatic 
                                                 
14 Non-discriminatory immigration policies were enacted a little later by Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand.  
15 Before 1979 the overall quota for the Eastern Hemisphere was 170,000 per annum; for the Western 
Hemisphere it was 120,000 until 1976 and then 88,800 for 1977-78.    23
changes on the supply side transformed the benign policy regime into a surge of 
migration.  
Third World schooling revolutions started reducing the education gap: A revolution 
in primary schooling and literacy took place in the Third World prior to the emigration 
boom (Easterlin 1981; Schultz 1987), and it started to erase the education gap between 
the US and sending countries. Between 1960 and 1981 the ratio of expected years of 
schooling in industrial countries relative to low-income countries fell from 1.92 to 1.60, 
and the same ratio relative to middle income oil importers fell from 1.82 to 1.44 
(Williamson 1993: Table 4.8). Between 1960 and 1987, the education stock (school years 
per person ages 15-64: Nehru et al. 1995: Table 1) rose by only 0.3 percent per annum in 
the industrial countries, but by 4 percent in the developing world. Based on our model 
and the countries in our sample, the direct effects of those trends would have been to 
increase emigration rates from Latin America and the Caribbean by 5 log points between 
1950-4 and 1970-4, by 10 log points from Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, and by 
8 log points for Sub-Saharan Africa.  
Growth miracles started unlocking the poverty trap: Not many Third World regions 
started catching up with the industrial world like the East Asian gang of four did, but per 
capita incomes did rise enough to start unlocking Third World poverty traps. Between 
1950 and 1970, per capita income rose by 52 percent in Africa, by 41 percent in East 
Asia, by 59 percent in Latin America, and – pulled by oil – by 125 percent in the Middle 
East (Maddison 2008). The direct effects of unlocking the poverty trap would have added 
10 log points to the emigration rate from Asia between 1950-4 and 1970-4.    24
Demographic transitions began to yield fat young adult cohorts: The timing of the 
demographic transition in the Third World mattered. The share of Asia’s population aged 
0-14 started rising rapidly in the 1950s, with the result that the migration-sensitive age 
group rose sharply in the 1970s and 1980s.  The share of the working age population in 
Asia rose dramatically after it bottomed out in the late 1960s, and other sending regions 
followed. For example, the East Asian adult percent share rose from about 57 in 1965 to 
67 in 1995 (ADB 1997: Figure 3.4). Based on our model, the direct effects of the 
demographic transition would have added a huge 20 log points to emigration rates from 
Latin America and the Caribbean and from Asia, the Middle East and North Africa from 
1950-4 to 1970-4. Demographic pressures increased a little later in sub-Saharan Africa 
but they still would have added about 16 log points to the migration rate between 1950-4 
and 1970-4.  
  What would have happened if the US Congress had passed those Amendments to 
the US Immigration Act in 1950 rather than 1965? Emigration pressures stemming from 
the key fundamentals were much lower in 1950 but by the 1960s they were building up. 
Most importantly, the stock of migrants from the Third World was relatively low in 1950 
partly because emigration pressures were modest and partly because of discriminatory 
policies, like the Asiatic Barred Zone which prohibited Asian immigration from 1917 to 
1952. This suggests that emigration from Asia would have surged in the 1960s rather 
than in the 1970s when its share in total US immigration increased from 12.9 percent in 
1961-9 to 35.3 percent in 1971-9 (Hatton and Williamson 2005, p. 208). In Latin 
America, emigration pressures were building up more slowly, policy was much less 
restrictive, and there was already a substantial migrant stock. As a result, the emigration   25
rate rose only modestly between the 1960s and the 1970s. Finally, emigration from 
Africa was very small in the 1950s as Africans were constrained both by colonialism and 
poverty. Although migration from Africa rose continuously, the base was very small and 
the increase was driven almost entirely by the migrant stock.  
  
Host Country Implications 
 
 
This paper has argued that to understand the forces that drive international 
migration we must take a source country perspective. Only then can we assess the 
fundamental forces that have underpinned the ebb and flow of migration over the last half 
century that will drive migration in the future.  Much of literature, however, takes a host 
country perspective and its agenda is often determined by host country concerns about 
rising migration pressure leading to soaring immigration rates. What do we find when we 
look instead at the supply side, using the United States as our window on the process? 
Trends in migration rates are very different when viewed from a source country 
perspective. Since the Second World War, population growth rates have been higher and 
fell later in poor sending countries compared with rich host countries where they have 
been lower and fell sooner. This has served to influence the timing and magnitude of the 
migration rates: emigration rates have tended to lead immigration rates, but they have 
been less dramatic.  
These trends in late 20
th century Third World emigration rates trace out country 
and region life cycles, and the underlying fundamentals can be identified. First, the US 
migrant stock effect made the most important contribution to the boom up to the 1990s, 
reflecting both the importance of family reunification in US immigration policy and that   26
the impact of previous changes in the economic and demographic fundamentals got 
embedded in the current migrant stock. Indeed, were it not for the migrant stock effect, 
Asian emigration rates would have fallen after 1970-74, rather than rising to 1980-4. The 
change in the poverty trap mattered only for Africa, where a rise in poverty rates reduced 
emigration rates over time. Education catch up played an important role everywhere in 
the Third World, augmenting emigration rates. The birth cohort effect also played an 
important role in Latin America and Africa, but not in Asia (where much of the 
demographic transition had already run its course by the 1970s). While there was 
certainly per capita income growth in Asia and Latin America, it was not fast enough to 
reduce the income gap with the US, and thus it contributed a little to the emigration 
boom. For Africa, however, it contributed a lot, as poor growth performance caused 
Africa to lose ground and the income gap to rise.  
Having estimated the causes of the Third World emigration rates over the past 
half century, we turned to projections of the future. These projections speak to a changing 
composition of US immigration by source and its total size. In 2000-4, the US 
immigration shares (of the three region total) were 41 percent from Latin America and 
the Caribbean, 53 percent from Asia, North Africa and the Middle East, and 6 percent 
from Sub-Saharan Africa. By 2020-4, the share from Latin America and the Caribbean is 
projected to fall to 38 percent while the share from Asia, the Middle East and North 
Africa will decrease modestly to 52 percent. The most striking change is the rise in the 
share from sub-Saharan Africa from 6 to 10 percent, a significant increase in the share of 
Africans. In short, US immigrants will be more African and less Hispanic fifteen or 
twenty years for now.   27
A final observation is this. History demonstrates that migration stock dynamics 
are important. During the transatlantic migrations of the late 19
th century, for each 
thousand of the migrant stock 20 more migrants were pulled across the Atlantic each year 
(Hatton and Williamson 2005, p. 65). That 19
th century figure is close to the late 20
th 
century 18 per thousand estimate obtained here. The ‘friends and relatives effect’ was 
particularly strong in the upswing of every sending region emigration cycle, first for 
Latin American emigrants, a little later for Asian emigrants, and most recently (and in the 
future) for the Africans. While the migrant stock effects tend to fade over time, they 
nevertheless cause migration rates to persist long after the other fundamentals have 
turned down. This is an important reason why the impending decline in Third World 
emigration rates has been obscured from view.  
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Data Appendix 
 
Countries included in Regression Analysis 
 
Latin America and the Caribbean  
Argentina Costa  Rica Haiti  Paraguay 
Barbados Cuba  Honduras Peru 
Bolivia Dominican  Republic  Jamaica  Suriname 
Brazil  Ecuador  Mexico  Trinidad & Tobago 
Chile El  Salvador  Nicaragua  Uruguay 
Colombia Guatemala  Panama  Venezuela 
Asia, Middle East and North Africa 
Afghanistan India  Kuwait  Syria 
Algeria Indonesia  Malaysia  Thailand 
Bangladesh Iran  Nepal  Tunisia 
China   Iraq  Pakistan Turkey 
Cyprus Israel  Philippines   
Egypt Jordan  Singapore   
Hong Kong  Korea  Sri Lanka   
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Cameroon Liberia  Sudan  Zimbabwe 
Dem. Rep. Congo  Senegal  Tanzania   
Ghana Sierra  Leone  Uganda   




Immigration to USA: Five-year total immigration to the United States by country of birth is taken 
from the Department of Homeland Security, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics (before 2002 
entitled the Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service). Five year totals 
calculated from annual data, with an adjustment to the years 1976 and earlier for the change in the 
fiscal year. The country of origin classification used here is country of birth rather than country of 
last residence. This ensures consistency with the immigrant flow and the immigrant stock as 
measured in the census. 
 
Immigrant stock in the US: Foreign born stock data for the census years 1970, 1980 and 1990 are 
taken from C. J. Gibson and E. Lennon (1999), “Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-born 
Population of the United States, 1850-1990,” US Census Bureau Population Division, Technical 
Working Paper No. 29.  Data for 2000 were obtained from the 2000 US Census. The intervening 
years 1975, 1985 and 1995 using the stock accumulation equation St+1 = (1-d)St + Mt where M is 
the migrant inflow, S is the migrant stock and d is the  ‘depreciation ‘ rate calculated for each 
intercensal period.  
 
Source country population: Total population and share aged 0-14 taken from United Nations 
(2007), “World Population Prospects: the 2006 Revision” (CD ROM).  
 
Years of education: Average years of education for the population age 15 and over, at five-year 
intervals from the database of Barro and Lee, available at: http://www2.cid.harvard.edu. 
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Income per capita: Income per capita at constant 2000 prices (chain series) for years ending in 0 
and 5 from  A. Heston, R. Summers and B. Aten, Penn World Table 6.2, University of 
Pennsylvania, Center for International Comparisons of Production Income and Prices, available 
at: http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php. 
 
US immigration policy: The immigration policy constraint is modeled as the number of 
immigrants coming under the overall quota. These include non-immediate relatives, employment 
visas, diversity immigrants, refugees and asylees, and those admitted under the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act (1986). We take the effect of IRCA to be an increase in immigration of 
2.7 million spread over the three years 1989-1991.  This measure of the overall quota is applied to 
all countries, rather than being tailored to each country. It amounts to two thirds of total 
immigration between 1970 and 2005, with the other third accounted for by those family-reunified 
migrants that do not fall under the US quota. The calculation of these categories is discussed in 
full in Clark et al. (2007).The total of these categories for each five-year period is expressed per 
thousand of the population in the three world regions at the beginning of the period.     32
  
Table 1 
Immigration and Emigration Rates to the US from Source Regions 
Years 1970-4  1975-9 1980-4 1985-9 1990-4 1995-9  2000-4
 Immigration  Rates 
Latin Am & Carib  100.00  116.19 113.82 267.96 273.01 169.01 186.76
Sub-Saharan Africa  100.00  190.59 242.64 380.39 489.00 700.78 840.47
Asia (inc MENA)  100.00  150.24 192.58 190.97 207.89 154.69 179.42
 Emigration  Rates 
Latin Am & Carib  100.00  107.24 98.09 218.51 212.08 126.77  136.48
S-S Africa  100.00  174.50 201.02 286.67 336.88 446.01  498.02
Asia (inc MENA)  100.00  142.45 197.48 165.68 150.27 93.25 91.81
         
 Immigration  Rates 
Mexico 100.00  90.88 95.41 356.58 382.82 185.99  205.67
Central America  100.00  182.07 248.35 665.26 569.31 417.81  559.17
Caribbean 100.00  119.95 99.43 137.88 137.58 110.55 102.51
S. America  100.00  155.16 157.43 221.16 218.23 188.74  226.39
S-S Africa  100.00  190.59 242.64 380.39 489.00 700.78  840.47
S. Asia  100.00  132.54 167.32 200.13 271.52 269.46  349.66
MENA 100.00  200.89 301.80 256.40 274.68 158.41  171.20
E. Asia  100.00  118.76 123.88 131.14 132.89 104.86  125.67
 Emigration  Rates 
Mexico 100.00  81.29 77.99 274.27 279.54 130.55  140.65
Central America  100.00  164.99 204.99 515.90 409.47 279.47  350.01
Caribbean 100.00  115.47 94.32 128.30 125.32 100.38 93.35
S. America  100.00  144.01 136.80 181.62 170.88 142.97  167.35
S-S Africa  100.00  174.50 201.02 286.67 336.88 446.01  498.02
S. Asia  100.00  123.92 147.28 166.50 214.38 203.87  255.01
MENA 100.00  187.42 263.54 212.70 217.74 121.08  126.90
E. Asia  100.00  111.82 114.23 119.21 118.33 93.36  112.91
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Table 2 
Time Trends in Log Migration Rates to the US 
 
  Latin America and 
Caribbean 
Asia, Middle East 





















2 (within)  0.217 0.177 0.449
Countries 26 35 38
Observations 182 245 266
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the five year total immigration from a source country divided by the 





Immigration and Emigration Rates to Canada and Germany from Source Regions 
 1970-4  1975-9 1980-4 1985-9 1990-4 1995-9  2000-4
  Immigration Rates to Canada 
Latin America  100.00 87.43 57.28 80.24 103.28 52.43 57.80
Africa  100.00 129.75 82.84 129.55 243.66 215.83 313.02
Asia   100.00 111.21 125.29 156.87 293.86 259.37 276.49
  Emigration Rates to Canada 
Latin America  100.00 88.77 58.69 82.32 107.35 54.69 59.90
Africa  100.00 120.90 70.98 101.28 181.07 149.37 201.28
Asia   100.00 105.90 114.79 137.89 256.46 221.16 230.31
  Immigration Rates to Germany 
Latin America  100.00 85.35 82.59 110.36 120.73 115.43  126.99
Africa  100.00 95.92 114.55 138.52 266.90 179.87  191.21
Asia   100.00 158.49 201.65 268.77 323.98 300.91 369.94
Turkey  100.00 64.62 41.95 36.45 37.71 29.04 25.65
  Emigration Rates to Germany 
Latin America  100.00 81.85 75.08 94.55 101.38 94.48 98.51
Africa  100.00 84.41 87.07 90.43 160.24 97.69 92.04
Asia   100.00 142.54 163.90 197.31 228.42 201.36 230.66









 Determinants of Emigration Rates over 5 Year Periods 1970-4 to 2000-4 
(Fixed effects, 62 countries) 
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Period dummies  Yes No No  No
R
2 (within)  0.439 0.398 0.386  0.271
R
2 (between)  0.925 0.896 0.915  0.001
Countries 62 62 62  62
Observations 434 434 434  434
 
 
Notes: fixed effects estimation on a balanced panel of five year total immigration for fiscal years—e.g. 
1970-4 is fiscal years 1970/1 to 1974/5. All other variables are for the beginning of each five year period, 
e,g, 1970 or 1985.  
Sources: See Appendix.    35
 
Table 5 
Actual and Predicted Log Migration, 1970-4 to 2000-4 
(log points deviation from mean) 
 
 Latin  America  and 
Caribbean (24) 
Asia, Middle East and 
North Africa (25) 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
(13) 
  Actual Predicted Actual Predicted Actual Predicted
1970-4 -0.36  -0.44 -0.39 -0.42 -0.91  -0.56
1975-9 -0.08  -0.25 -0.16 -0.19 -0.35  -0.33
1980-4 -0.13  -0.18 -0.01 -0.14 -0.19  -0.24
1985-9 0.31  0.22 0.13 0.25 0.13  0.15
1990-4 0.25  0.20 0.26 0.17 0.32  0.19
1995-9 -0.03  0.23 0.01 0.17 0.45  0.33






Contributions to Trends in Log Migration 1970-4 to 2000-4 
(difference in log points) 
 
  Latin America and 
Caribbean (24) 
Asia, Middle East and 
North Africa (25) 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa (13) 










Birth Cohort  0.07  -0.08 0.06 -0.07  0.08
Migrant Stock  0.38  0.12 0.36 0.11  0.65
Income Gap  0.08  0.03 -0.02 0.01  0.28
Education Gap  0.05  0.02 0.12 0.03  0.11
Poverty 0.00  0.00 0.03 0.02  -0.14
Poverty×Stock 0.01  0.01 0.00 0.00  0.08
Sum 0.59  0.10 0.55 0.10  1.06
Actual   0.67  -0.27 0.52 0.03  1.46
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Table 7 
Time Trends in Fundamentals, 1970-4 to 2000-4 
 
 Birth  cohort  Log  GDP  ratio Log  education 
years ratio 
Poverty 











































Predicted Trends in Log Migration Rate from 2000-4 to 2020-4 
(difference in log points) 
 
 Latin  America  and 
Caribbean (24) 
Asia, Middle East & 
North Africa (25) 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
(13) 
Birth Cohort  -0.21 -0.22 -0.06
Income Gap  0.07 -0.03 0.21
Education Gap  0.05 0.11 0.09
Poverty 0.00 0.08 -0.26
Stock Dynamics  0.00 0.08 0.21
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